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A number of theoretical studies have predicted that preferential trade agreements
(PTAs) raise outside multinationals￿incentive to invest in the participating countries,
especially in those that are integrated with larger markets and have lower production
costs. The hypothesis has however not been tested empirically. This paper addresses
the issue by estimating the impact of PTAs on countries￿ability to attract multina-
tionals. The evidence is broadly consistent with expectations. The formation of PTAs
leads to an increase in FDI by outside multinationals, but the e⁄ect varies sharply with
the size of integrated markets and countries￿comparative advantage. Countries inte-
grated with larger markets experience a greater increase in total and export-platform
FDI. Those with a higher labor endowment also attract more FDI especially in labor-
intensive industries, but at the expense of their labor-scarce PTA partners.
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11 Introduction
The proliferation of regional economic integration is reshaping the ￿ ows of Foreign Direct Invest-
ment (FDI). An increasing number of multinational corporations (MNCs) move their production
across borders, especially to countries that have lower production costs and better access to large
markets. General Motors (GM), for example, recently undertook aggressive job cuts in its German-
based subsidiary, Opel, and shut down its plant near Lisbon, Portugal. At the same time as these
contractions, it built a new production facility in Poland, a recent member of the European Union
(EU).1 Similarly, the Dutch-based electronics group Philips closed the operations of its Novalux
subsidiary in Spain in 2004 and transferred the research and development (R&D) section to France
and the manufacturing section to Poland.2 In fact, the World Investment Report (2005) indicates
that these two companies￿location adjustment re￿ ects an aggregate trend in FDI. The statistics
show that while the total in￿ ow of FDI to the EU rose in 2004, the majority of the EU-15 countries
experienced a decrease in new investment. Countries such as Ireland and Spain, which used to
be able to attract a large volume of FDI prior to 2004 because of their relative advantage in labor
cost and corporate tax in the EU-15, now see investment ￿ ow to some of the more competitive
new EU members.
Economic theories suggest that when a PTA is formed, ￿rms from outside the region are
motivated to move their production to the integrated bloc because the bene￿t of preferential
market access is exclusive to inside ￿rms.3 The e⁄ect is, however, not uniform across integrated
countries. Countries that are integrated with a larger number of countries or countries with a
larger market size are more likely to experience an increase in FDI. Furthermore, as trade costs
fall within the region, ￿rms have a greater incentive to concentrate their production in the country
with lower production costs and achieve greater economies of scale. As a result, low-cost countries
will receive a greater amount of FDI at the expense of their high-cost PTA partners and become
the platforms from which multinationals export to other countries.
This paper seeks to examine the above hypotheses. In particular, it asks: Does regional
economic integration increase outside multinationals￿investments in the participating countries?
Which countries gain multinational ￿rms at the expense of others? And do multinationals indeed
adopt some integrated countries as export platforms? While the theoretical literature yields
clear predictions on the above questions, little has been done to test them. In fact, very few
empirical studies, with the exceptions of Barrel and Pain (1999), Feinberg and Keane (2001), and
Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007), have examined the relationship between regional economic
integration and FDI. Barrel and Pain (1999) were one of the ￿rst to explore the FDI e⁄ect of
the Single Market Programme implemented in the European Union (EU). They ￿nd that the
1European Industrial Relations Observatory, October 30, 2006.
2European Industrial Relations Observatory, March 3, 2004.
3Examples of classic theoretical work in this area include Motta and Norman (1996), Krugman and Venables
(1996), Puga and Venables (1997), and Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007). See Section 2 for a detailed
discussion of these studies.
2removal of trade barriers within the EU has changed the permeability of national borders and
raised FDI in four major European economies. Feinberg and Keane (2001) analyze the e⁄ect of
trade liberalization between the U.S. and Canada and ￿nd that a lower U.S. tari⁄raises the exports
of U.S. multinational a¢ liates in Canada back to the U.S. A more recent study by Ekholm, Forslid
and Markusen (2007) focuses on multinational a¢ liates￿exports to third countries and shows that
multinationals located in a free trade area tend to engage in export-platform FDI.
This paper contributes to the above literature in two ways. First, instead of estimating the
e⁄ect of a single PTA, it examines how the e⁄ect of PTAs depends on the size of the integrated
region. As shown in Figure 1, which is constructed based on U.S. multinational a¢ liate sales
data in 2002, multinational ￿rms are unevenly distributed across regions. The paper seeks to
explain this pattern by introducing the role of regional economic integration. The paper posits
that because integrated regions vary in the size of participating countries (e.g., the EU versus the
MERCOSUR) the extent to which PTAs can raise member countries￿ability to attract foreign
investments is di⁄erent. A member of a larger integrated bloc has preferential access to a larger
region and thus o⁄ers a stronger incentive for outside ￿rms to invest in the country. The paper
also takes into account the fact that countries often belong to more than one preferential trade
agreement. In these cases, countries with two or more PTA memberships (e.g., Mexico) become a
hub and can export to all the spoke countries at low or zero tari⁄(e.g., Canada and Japan, both of
which have a Free Trade Agreement with Mexico), whereas the same bene￿t does not necessarily
apply between spokes. Firms that seek to minimize trade costs are therefore more likely to locate
their production in the hub countries. These hypotheses have been largely ignored in the empirical
literature and will be formally tested in this study.
[Figure 1 about here]
This paper also examines how regional economic integration may lead to an asymmetric FDI
e⁄ect within an integrated bloc. While integration may raise the total volume of foreign direct in-
vestment in the region, multinationals￿investment incentive can be weakened in some participating
countries. This is because the improvement in market access between integrated countries o⁄ers
￿rms a greater incentive to concentrate their production geographically and realize economies of
scale. As it becomes less costly to export within the integrated region, multinationals￿production
in less attractive locations, e.g., countries with relatively high production costs, can be replaced
by exports from the other production locations in the region. The former countries may therefore
experience a decline in inward FDI while their more attractive, low-cost PTA partners witness an
increase. This is especially likely when countries in the integrated region are highly heterogeneous.
This hypothesis has been established in theoretical studies but largely overlooked in the empirical
literature.
The paper is also built on the broader literature that examines the causes of FDI. Two
main motives have been established in previous studies. First, ￿rms may choose to invest in a
3foreign market to avoid trade costs. This will happen when the bene￿t of proximity to consumers
outweighs the bene￿t of scale economy, in which case ￿rms are better o⁄ engaging in horizontal
FDI and duplicating their production in countries with similar factor endowment. This strategy
has been referred to as the market access or tari⁄ jumping motive and is formally established in
studies such as Markusen (1984) and Markusen and Venables (2000). Firms may also choose to
invest abroad because of foreign countries￿comparative advantage. When the production process
consists of separable stages that require di⁄erent factor intensities, ￿rms may prefer to locate each
stage in a country where the factor used intensively in that stage is abundant. This strategy
leads to a vertical type of FDI and is referred to as the comparative advantage motive. It has
been examined in in￿ uential studies such as Krugman (1984). The above two motives have also
been tested in a number of important empirical papers, including Brainard (1997), Markusen and
Maskus (1999), Carr, Markusen and Maskus (2001), Markusen and Maskus (2001), and Yeaple
(2003). While papers such as Brainard (1997) ￿nd mainly evidence of horizontal FDI, Carr,
Markusen and Maskus (2001) and Yeaple (2003) lend support to both horizontal and vertical FDI.
This study is closely related to the above strand of literature but focuses on how a decline in
trade costs within a bloc may lead multinational ￿rms to adjust their location choices. The paper
suggests that while ￿rms from outside the bloc are motivated to move their production to the
integrated region because the bene￿t of preferential market access is exclusive to insiders, they no
longer have the incentive to have multiple plants within the region. Not only would they become
more geographically concentrated and serve some intra-regional markets through exports, their
choice of production locations would be dominated by the comparative advantage factor.
To test these predictions and estimate the role of regional economic integration, this paper
constructs a measure of market potential for each potential host country. This measure of market
potential is motivated by previous studies including Harris (1954), Krugman (1992), Head and
Mayer (2004), and Hanson (2005). It takes into account not only the host-country market size
but also the size of other countries (discounted by trade costs). The paper posits that the
formation of a preferential trade agreement improves a participating country￿ s market access to its
PTA partners and raises its market potential in foreign markets. Countries that are integrated
with large markets therefore have a greater ability to attract multinationals. The paper departs
from the previous studies, in particular, Head and Mayer (2004), by distinguishing host countries￿
export markets to (i) MNCs￿home country, (ii) countries that have formed a PTA with the host
country (excluding MNCs￿home country), and (iii) the rest of the world. This distinction makes
it possible to estimate the importance of market integration in a country￿ s ability to receive foreign
investments.
The empirical evidence is broadly consistent with the hypotheses. First, the paper ￿nds, based
on both U.S. and other OECD countries￿FDI data, that multinationals do have a greater incentive
to invest in a region after economic integration. The e⁄ect is however signi￿cantly asymmetric
across integrated countries and varies sharply with the size of the integrated region and the com-
4parative advantage of host countries. Those that are integrated with a larger number of countries
or countries with a larger market size experience a greater increase in outside multinationals￿ac-
tivities. Within integrated regions, countries with a greater labor endowment attract more FDI,
especially in labor-intensive industries where their capital-abundant PTA partners experience a
decline. Regional economic integration is also found to increase export-platform FDI as predicted
in the theoretical literature. This e⁄ect again rises with the size of countries with which the host
is integrated. The paper also estimates the e⁄ect of PTAs on intra-bloc FDI and ￿nds that while
PTAs signi￿cantly raise the investment from outside the region they do not promote intra-regional
FDI. This is not surprising considering that regional integration not only lowers MNCs￿tari⁄-
jumping motive within the region but also increases the competition from outside MNCs. These
￿ndings are robust to the measures of FDI: both a¢ liate sales and FDI out￿ ow from outside the
region are found to rise when the region is integrated.
The paper accounts for the potential issue of omitted variables using the novel approach in-
troduced by Head and Mayer (2004). Speci￿cally, it constructs a generalized measure of market
potential that takes into account factors such as the degree of competition in export markets and
additional trade costs such as language and national border. This generalized measure serves as a
better indicator of export demand and does not change the results qualitatively. The e⁄ect of PTA
partners on host countries￿ability to attract multinationals remains signi￿cant. The paper also
addresses the potential endogeneity of preferential trade agreements by investigating the economic
and political determinants of PTAs. Using a two-stage Instrumental Variable (IV) method, the
paper ￿nds that the estimated e⁄ect of economic integration on both total and export-platform
FDI remains similar.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the main hypotheses of this
paper and the econometric framework. Section 3 describes the data employed in the analysis.
Section 4 discusses the main empirical results, while Section 5 presents sensitivity analyses includ-
ing an alternative data sample, di⁄erent estimation methodology and approaches to deal with the
issues of omitted variables and potential endogeneity of PTAs. Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Hypotheses and econometric framework
Several theoretical studies, including Motta and Norman (1996), Krugman and Venables (1996),
Puga and Venables (1997), and Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen (2007), have formally examined the
e⁄ect of regional economic integration on multinationals￿location decision. Motta and Norman
(1996) adopt a game theoretic model of FDI and ￿nd that the formation of a preferential trade
agreement between two countries can motivate ￿rms in the third country to invest in the integrated
region and engage in export-platform FDI. In a two-country two-industry model, Krugman and
Venables (1996) show that at lower trade barriers agglomeration force can dominate ￿rms￿location
decision and lead each industry to concentrate in a single location. Puga and Venables (1997)
5consider a more complicated trading system and also ￿nd that a fall in trade barriers can lead
some member countries to gain industries at the expense of other countries. The recent study by
Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007) introduces country asymmetry to the model. They ￿nd
that the formation of a free trade area between a large, high-cost country and a small, low-cost
country will increase export-platform FDI in the latter country from both inside and outside ￿rms.
In sum, several predictions have been reached in the literature. First, a fall in trade cost
between two countries is expected to raise a third-country ￿rm￿ s incentive to produce in the
integrated region. This is especially true for countries that are integrated with large markets.
However, not all integrated countries will necessarily experience an increase in FDI: those with
lower production costs are likely to gain outside multinationals at the expense of their high-cost
PTA partners, as multinationals now have a greater incentive to concentrate their production
within the region and achieve greater economies of scale. This also leads to the third prediction
of the literature: when countries form a preferential trade agreement, multinationals would adopt
the country with relatively low production costs as an export platform and export to the other
countries from there.
To test these intuitive predictions, the paper estimates the following baseline equation:
FDIhikt = ￿ + ￿1Xhikt + ￿2Mit + ’hk + ￿ik + ￿t + "hikt; (1)
where FDIhikt is the natural log of FDI from home country h to foreign country i in industry
k and year t, Xhikt represents a vector of home- and host-country characteristics that capture
MNCs￿market access and comparative advantage motives, ’hk and ￿ik are vectors of home- and
host-country-industry dummies that control for all country-industry speci￿c factors, ￿t is a vector
of time dummies, and "ikt denotes the error term.4
The equation also includes a measure of host countries￿status in regional integration, Mit,
the primary variable of the analysis. The construction of this variable is motivated by previous
studies including Harris (1954), Krugman (1992), Head and Mayer (2004) and Hanson (2005). It
re￿ ects the total potential demand faced by each host country, taking into account not only the
host country￿ s domestic market size but also the size of export markets including respectively its
PTA partners and the rest of the world. The exact formula is:















where Mit denotes the market potential of host country i at year t, Yit, Yht and Yjt represent
respectively the market size of host country i, MNCs￿ home country h, and other country j,
PTAiht and PTAijt are dummy variables that are equal to 1 if host country i has a PTA with,
respectively, MNCs￿home country and country j, and !1, !2 and !3 are the parameters to be
4Note that by including both the cross-section and time ￿xed e⁄ects this paper essentially employs a di⁄erence-
in-di⁄erence estimator to analyze the e⁄ect of regional economic integration.
6estimated. Note that each non-host country￿ s market size is also weighed by the transport cost of
exporting to that country from the host, denoted by ￿ih and ￿ij. Countries that are geographically
distant from the host country are considered to have a smaller weight in the host country￿ s market
potential.
It is also noteworthy that a country￿ s PTA partners are divided in equation (2) to MNCs￿home
country and countries other than the home and host countries. This distinction is important
because home-host PTA a⁄ects multinationals di⁄erently from the PTAs that exclude MNCs￿
home country. The former captures the e⁄ect of economic integration on intra-regional FDI
while the latter represents the e⁄ect of economic integration on FDI from outside the bloc. As
discussed above, PTAs are expected to increase investment by outside multinationals because of
improved market accessibility in the integrated region. But this e⁄ect is not necessarily true for
multinationals inside the bloc. The reason is twofold. First, while PTAs formed between MNCs￿
home and host countries (such as the NAFTA) lower the cost of (U.S.) a¢ liates exporting products
to the home market and stimulate vertical FDI, they also lower the cost of ￿rms exporting from
home to the foreign market. Firms are thus less likely to undertake horizontal FDI in which
the incentive to avoid trade costs is the original motive to invest abroad. Home-host PTAs can
also decrease intra-regional FDI because of the increased investment and production by outside
multinationals. For example, if the EU multinationals increase their investment in Mexico after
NAFTA was formed, the increased competition can adversely a⁄ect U.S. multinationals.
To examine how the e⁄ect of economic integration may depend on the characteristics of inte-
grated countries, Equation (1) is modi￿ed as follows:
FDIhikt = ￿ + ￿1Xhikt + ￿2Mit + ￿3Xhikt ￿ PTAit + ’hk + ￿ik + ￿t + "hikt; (3)
where a vector of interaction terms, i.e., Xhikt ￿ PTAit, is formed between the host-country char-
acteristics and a dummy variable PTAit that identi￿es integrated host countries at year t. The
parameters of the interaction variables ￿3 re￿ ect how the e⁄ect of preferential trade agreements
varies with country attributes.
To test the hypothesis on export-platform FDI, the paper follows Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen
(2007) and considers MNCs￿exports to third countries as the dependent variable. The relevant
estimation equation is
export_FDIhikt = ￿ + ￿1X0
hikt + ￿2Me
it + ’hk + ￿ik + ￿t + "hikt; (4)
where X0
hikt is the corresponding vector of explanatory variables and Me
it is the host country￿ s














7In addition to host countries￿market potential, the following explanatory variables are included
to test MNCs￿market access and comparative advantage motives. First, the paper controls for the
host-country sectoral tari⁄rates on multinationals￿home country and expects a positive correlation
between the two. The home-country sectoral tari⁄ rates on each host country are also included.
In contrast to the host-country tari⁄, this tari⁄ is expected to adversely a⁄ect multinationals,
especially those that seek to export their ￿nal products from foreign a¢ liates to the home market.
Freight cost between home and host countries is also included as a measure of trade costs and
expected to have an ambiguous e⁄ect on FDI. While a greater freight cost motivates ￿rms to
supply foreign markets through local production instead of exports, it discourages multinationals
from undertaking vertical FDI and exporting back home.
Following the existing empirical literature, a country￿ s factor endowment ratio, i.e., K=L, is
used to represent the country￿ s comparative advantage.5 It is not only included independently
but also interacted with industries￿capital intensity to test the hypothesis that capital-abundant
countries attract capital-intensive multinationals whereas labor-abundant countries attract more
labor-intensive ￿rms. Finally, the estimations also take into account countries￿corporate tax rate
and expect a negative correlation with the level of FDI.
3 Data
The main dataset employed in this paper is taken from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis
(BEA). This dataset reports the sales and exports of U.S. majority owned a¢ liates in major
manufacturing industries and 40 countries during the period between 1986 and 1999.6 Sections 5.1
and 5.2 consider an alternative dataset that is obtained from the OECD FDI database and include
additional source countries such as Germany, Italy, Portugal and Japan. Including these countries,
in particular, the EU members, enables the paper to examine the robustness of the estimates,
especially the estimated e⁄ect of PTAs on intra-regional FDI.7 This dataset however does not
report information on export-platform FDI, i.e., exports of multinationals to third countries. It
also contains a large number of missing values at the industry level, which lead the analysis in
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 to use country-level FDI data.
A summary of the BEA dataset is provided in Table 1. First, the a¢ liate sales is divided
5Sectoral unit labor costs would be another possible measure of comparative advantage. Such information can
be obtained from the International Labor Organization, Bureau of Labor Statistics, and the UNIDO database, but
there are many missing values in these datasets which would reduce the sample size substantially.
6Table A.1 lists the included countries. Because the BEA switched the industry classi￿cation from SIC to NAICE
in 1999, the data of a¢ liate sales and exports is recorded in SIC codes until 1999. These data cannot be matched
with the data after 1999 because of the level of aggregation. As a result, the sample period is between 1986 and
1999.
7Section 5 also considers an alternative measure of FDI, i.e., the level of FDI out￿ ow. While a¢ liate sales have
been adopted by the majority of existing studies (e.g., Brainard, 1997; Carr, Markusen and Maskus, 2001; Yeaple,
2003; Ekholm, Forslid and Markusen, 2007) as the measure of FDI, using FDI ￿ ow data allows the paper to directly
verify that the e⁄ect of regional economic integration in increasing multinationals￿geographic concentration is not
only re￿ ected in their sales and exports but also their investment activities.
8by host regions consisting of Western Europe, North America, South America, Southeast Asia,
and Australia-New Zealand, all of which have reached at least one preferential trade agreement
by 1999. Two observations are noteworthy. First, the volume of total a¢ liate sales has grown
at an annual rate of 13% between 1986 and 1998. Second, the percentage of total a¢ liate sales
by a¢ liates located in South America has increased from 3% to 6% from 1986 to 1998, while the
percentage of sales by a¢ liates located in Canada and Mexico has declined from 18% to 15%.
[Table 1 about here]
The data is then divided by sales destinations. The ￿rst category is the percentage of a¢ liate
sales to local consumers. This category captures the horizontal type of FDI that is undertaken
to avoid trade costs and access local markets. This component of multinationals￿activities is
dominant in all regions with the possible exception of Southeast Asia. The importance of this
component has, however, declined over time implying that U.S. multinationals have become rel-
atively less local-market oriented. The second category of a¢ liate sales is the percentage of
sales exported back to the U.S. This category re￿ ects U.S. multinationals￿comparative advantage
motive which leads them to move production abroad and serve U.S. consumers through exports.
Table 1 shows that this component of a¢ liate sales has grown signi￿cantly in Canada and Mexico
especially since 1994 when the NAFTA was formed, but has fallen in South America and Southeast
Asia. The last category is the share of a¢ liate sales exported to third countries (excluding the
host country and the U.S.), which is also de￿ned as export-platform FDI. This part of a¢ liate
sales is viewed as a combination of horizontal and vertical FDI and is highest in Western Europe
and Southeast Asia.
Table 2 compares a¢ liate sales and exports between integrated (i.e., countries that have at
least one PTA) and non-integrated countries (i.e., those that do not belong to any PTA). As
shown, the level of total a¢ liate sales is generally higher in integrated countries, especially in
machinery and transport industries. The same observation applies to the level of a¢ liate exports
while the di⁄erence between integrated and non-integrated countries is widened. The percentage
of exported a¢ liate sales is unambiguously greater in integrated countries, consistent with the
hypothesis that regional economic integration increases multinationals￿incentive to serve third
countries via exports and concentrate their production in export platforms.
[Table 2 about here]
Now consider the data used to construct the explanatory variables. This paper takes into
account all the preferential trade agreements that were implemented in the sample period and in
the sample countries.8 Speci￿cally, a dummy variable PTAijt is constructed to take the value of
1 when host country i has a preferential trade agreement with another country j at year t and 0
otherwise. Real GDP measured in 1995 U.S. dollars is adopted to measure the market size of host
8Table A.2 lists the preferential trade agreements included in the main dataset.
9and other countries and is obtained from the World Bank￿ s World Development Indicators. The
distance between the host and another country is used to proxy for transport cost. It is measured
by the straight-line distance between nation￿ s capitals in thousand kilometers and taken from the
City Distance Calculator provided by VulcanSoft.
To measure the host-country tari⁄ rates on the U.S. in a particular industry, the import-
weighted average is obtained based on tari⁄ rates at disaggregate industries. Both the tari⁄ and
import data are obtained from the COMTRADE database. The sectoral tari⁄ rates imposed by
the U.S. on the host country are available from the dataset described in Feenstra (1996). An ad
valorem measure of freight and insurance cost is also included in the paper and constructed based
on the U.S. import data recorded in Feenstra (1996).
To construct countries￿factor endowment ratio, each country￿ s capital stock is obtained by
the perpetual inventory method outlined in Leamer (1984). In particular, the depreciation rate
is assumed as 7% and the initial value of capital stocks is taken from far enough in the past so
that the impact of the initial value on the estimated time series is small. The data of countries￿
labor force size is available at the World Development Indicators. Industries￿capital intensity
is measured by the share of capital expenditure in value added. This data is taken from the
NBER-CES manufacturing industry database and the U.S. Annual Survey of Manufacturers. The
paper also follows the method discussed in Hines and Rice (1994) and obtains a measure of applied
corporate tax for each host country.
4 Empirical evidence
4.1 The e⁄ect of regional economic integration on multinationals
The estimations in this section proceed by ￿rst measuring a host country￿ s status of economic
integration with either a dummy variable or a simple count of PTA partners. The results are
reported in the second and third columns of Table 3. The results show that regional economic
integration on average exerts a signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect on outside MNCs￿activities in inte-
grated countries. Speci￿cally, having an additional PTA partner raises a country￿ s a¢ liate sales
by 11%.9
[Table 3 about here]
In the fourth column, the status of regional economic integration is represented by a simpli￿ed
measure of market potential that takes into account only the host country￿ s domestic market size
9Since the paper includes both Customs Union and FTA in the consideration of regional economic integration, it
is reasonable to expect that they may exert di⁄erent impacts on FDI. This is possible because the former requires
all the members to impose a uniform external tari⁄ system (against outside countries including the U.S.) while the
latter does not. However, since the level of the host country￿ s tari⁄ against the U.S. is included in the estimation,
the di⁄erence between the two types of PTAs is at least partially captured. In Section 4.2, the paper examines how
host countries￿di⁄erence in tari⁄s relative to their PTA partners may a⁄ect a¢ liate sales to di⁄erent extents. This
would essentially separate Customs Union from Free Trade Agreement.
10and the size of PTA partners (i.e., assuming !1 = 1, !2 = 1, and !3 = 0 in equation (2)). The
results indicate that a 1% increase in a host country￿ s market potential in these markets leads to a
1.04% increase in U.S. multinationals￿a¢ liate sales. This suggests that multinationals￿activities
increase not only with the number of PTA partners a country has but also the market size of these
countries.
Finally, the last column of Table 3 reports the results based on the measure of market potential
de￿ned in equation (2). This measure of market potential includes, in addition to the host-country
domestic market size, (i) the market size of MNCs￿home country if there exists a PTA between the
home and host, (ii) the market size of other PTA partners, and (iii) the rest of the world.10 The
relative importance of these di⁄erent groups, i.e., ^ !1, ^ !2 and ^ !3, is estimated in a Nonlinear Least-
Square model. The results show that a 1% increase in a host country￿ s aggregate market potential
leads to a 6.3% increase in a¢ liate sales. The weight of PTA partners that excludes multinationals￿
home country is however 23% (= 0:63=0:51￿1) greater than the weight of unintegrated countries.
This suggests that the former group plays a more important role than the latter in determining
the host country￿ s ability to attract MNCs.
Note in all the above speci￿cations PTAs formed between home and host countries are treated
separately. As discussed in Section 2, this distinction is important because, in contrast to the
PTAs formed between host and other countries, the e⁄ect of home-host PTAs captures the impact
of regional integration on intra-bloc FDI. On the one hand, they encourage multinationals to
engage in vertical FDI and supply home-country consumers via exports, especially when the PTA
partner countries are complementary in comparative advantage. On the other hand, they dis-
courage horizontal FDI in PTA partner countries and promote intra-regional trade. Furthermore,
because they raise the in￿ ow of FDI from outside the bloc, the increased competition from outside
multinationals can also reduce intra-bloc FDI. The estimates in Table 3 suggest that the PTAs
formed between the U.S. and host countries do not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on U.S. FDI.11
The estimated e⁄ect of other host-country variables also appears largely consistent with the
expectations. First, the evidence suggests a signi￿cant comparative advantage motive for U.S.
multinationals. Countries with a greater labor endowment tend to have greater a¢ liate sales,
especially in labor-intensive industries. The U.S. tari⁄ on host countries also has the expected
impact, suggesting that some U.S. MNCs engage in vertical FDI and supply home consumers with
foreign production. Freight cost is negatively associated with multinationals￿activities. As dis-
cussed in Section 2, this result can be attributed to either the negative e⁄ect of transport cost
on multinationals￿exports to the home country or the role of distance in raising the ￿xed cost of
10For host countries that do not have any PTAs, their market potential is the sum of their domestic market size
and group (iii) (i.e., the market size of the rest of the world), with the value of groups (i) and (ii) (i.e., the market
size of integrated countries) equal to zero. For host countries that have adopted a PTA in a certain year, the value
of group (ii) becomes positive in that year while the value of (iii) decreases, but the unweighted sum of (ii) and (iii)
remains the same.
11This result can however be driven by the inclusion of U.S. and host-country tari⁄s in the existing speci￿cations,
which at least partially control for the PTAs that exist between the U.S. and host countries.
11investment (such as the the monitoring cost). Multinationals￿tari⁄-jumping motive is also con-
￿rmed in the table. A 1% increase in the tari⁄ imposed by the host country raises multinationals￿
a¢ liate sales by about 0.8%. The e⁄ect of corporate tax is statistically insigni￿cant, which can
be partially due to the use of country-industry ￿xed e⁄ect.12
4.2 Geographic concentration of multinationals within integrated regions
While the above results suggest that regional economic integration does raise outside multina-
tionals￿activities in integrated countries, the e⁄ect is expected to vary across countries. Given
multinationals￿increased incentive to concentrate their production geographically, some countries
are likely to gain multinationals at the expense of others, especially their PTA partners. This
section hence evaluates the following questions: Do outside multinationals indeed become more
concentrated within the integrated region? What types of host countries gain more FDI? Which
countries lose? To address these issues, equation (3) is estimated where the PTA dummy variable
is interacted with host-country characteristics. Table 4 reports the results.
[Table 4 about here]
As seen in the upper part of Table 4, labor-abundant countries receive a greater increase in
multinationals￿a¢ liate sales than labor-scarce countries after forming preferential trade agree-
ments. This is especially true for labor-intensive industries. This ￿nding suggests that countries
in an integrated region will gain FDI in industries where they have a comparative advantage at
the cost of countries that have a comparative disadvantage in these same industries. The result
similarly holds for countries with a lower corporate tax. The e⁄ect of PTAs also depends on the
freight cost of exporting to the host countries from the U.S.: those that require a higher shipping
cost experience a greater increase in multinationals￿activities after integration.13 These results
are broadly consistent with the hypotheses outlined in Section 2.
Next, instead of comparing the e⁄ect of regional economic integration across all integrated
countries, the rest of this section compares each individual country with its PTA partners only.
The motivation for this comparison is that with free market access between integrated countries a
country is most likely to gain FDI from its PTA partners and vice versa. To test this hypothesis,
the di⁄erence between a host country￿ s characteristics and the average of its PTA partners is
calculated, i.e., ￿Xhikt ￿ Xhikt ￿ ￿ Xhjkt
￿
￿PTAijt=1, and interacted with the PTA dummy variable.
This measure captures the host country￿ s advantage or disadvantage in FDI determinants relative
to their PTA partners. The lower part of Table 4 reports the estimates. As expected, countries
that are relatively more labor abundant than their PTA partners receive a greater increase in
a¢ liate sales in labor intensive industries. Multinationals also tend to increase their activities in
countries that require a higher freight cost than their PTA partners.
12Host countries￿GDP is included separately in these columns and found to be positively correlated with multi-
nationals￿a¢ liate sales.
13Table 4 reports a selected list of estimates. The complete table is available upon request.
12Figures 2-4 depict the estimated marginal e⁄ect of an additional PTA partner for each host
country.14 The ￿gures suggest that there exists a statistically signi￿cant correlation between
country-speci￿c estimates and capital-labor endowment ratio. It is clear that not all integrated
countries gain multinationals. In the food industry, for example, labor-abundant countries, such as
Thailand, Malaysia, Peru and Chile, experience an increase in multinationals￿activities, whereas
capital-abundant countries such as most EU members see a decline. This ￿nding is not surprising
provided that food manufacturing is a labor-intensive industry. The sign of correlation is reversed
for the chemical (for the European countries) and electrical appliance industries as they require a
relatively high capital intensity. In particular, the positive impact of regional integration in the
electrical appliance industry is exclusive to a few industrial countries (e.g., Ireland, Switzerland
and Denmark); every other country witnesses a decline in FDI. These ￿ndings further suggest an
increasing concentration of multinational ￿rms within integrated blocs.
[Figures 2-4 about here]
4.3 Export-platform FDI
The geographic concentration of multinational ￿rms as a result of regional economic integration
should also lead to an increase in export-platform FDI. This prediction has been made in many
theoretical studies including Motta and Norman (1996) and Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007).
With a decline in trade costs within an integrated bloc, exporting from intra-regional production
location can be less costly than establishing a local production plant. Multinational ￿rms therefore
are more likely to engage in export-platform FDI than dispersed FDI. To test this hypothesis,
equation (4) is estimated where U.S. multinationals￿exports to third countries is adopted as the
dependent variable.15
As seen in Table 5, forming a preferential trade agreement does raise the exports of multi-
national a¢ liates.16 This e⁄ect also rises with the number of preferential trading partners (as
suggested in the third column) and the size of these partners (as suggested in the fourth column).
When the market size of integrated and unintegrated countries is taken into account separately, the
results indicate that the weight of PTA partners signi￿cantly exceeds that of the rest of the world.
This implies that preferential market access to other markets raises a country￿ s attractiveness as
14Because the paper includes a country-industry ￿xed e⁄ect, it cannot estimate country speci￿c e⁄ects of the PTA
dummy variable. This variable will be perfectly correlated with the ￿xed e⁄ect if a country has a PTA throughout
the sample period. Country speci￿c e⁄ects of an additional PTA partner are hence estimated instead.
15One drawback of the BEA export data is that it does not distinguish between integrated export markets and the
rest of the world. As a result, the e⁄ect of economic integration is estimated based on U.S. multinationals￿exports
to all third countries (countries other than the host and home countries). Explanatory variables are accordingly
adjusted for this estimation. First, the host country￿ s GDP is no longer included on the right hand side. Second,
the U.S. market is also excluded from the measure of market potential, because the current dependent variable,
i.e., multinationals￿exports to third countries, does not include the exports back to the U.S. For the same reason,
the U.S. tari⁄ rates on the host country are also dropped from the estimation. As a robustness check, the paper
considered including the host country￿ s GDP in the regressions and found it does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect.
16The size of the sample is signi￿cantly reduced because of the missing values in the export data.
13the export platform. Comparative advantage is also a signi￿cant determinant of export-platform
FDI. Host countries with a greater labor endowment tend to experience a larger increase in the
exports of multinational a¢ liates.
[Table 5 about here]
5 Sensitivity analysis
5.1 Including additional source countries
The empirical results have so far been obtained based on U.S. multinationals￿activities abroad.
This section explores the sensitivity of the results by including additional source countries, namely,
Germany, Italy, Portugal, Finland and Japan. The choice of these countries is determined by the
availability of outward FDI data obtained from the OECD FDI database.17 The inclusion of these
source countries, in particular, Germany, Italy, Portugal and Finland, allows the paper to estimate
the e⁄ect of PTAs (in particular, the EU) on intra- and extra-bloc FDI using a broader set of home
countries. Note however because of the large number of missing values at the sector level, the
analysis here is based on country-level a¢ liate sales. The explanatory variables are accordingly
adjusted for this change and closely follow the existing literature (e.g., Brainard, 1997; Carr et al.,
2001).
The results are presented in Table 6. As seen in the last column, while the host country￿ s
aggregate market potential continues to have a positive e⁄ect on the level of a¢ liate sales, the PTA
formed between home and host countries is found to exert a negative e⁄ect. This ￿nding implies
that the formation of a PTA can signi￿cantly lower MNCs￿tari⁄-jumping motive in the integrated
bloc and, furthermore, by raising the FDI from outside multinationals lead to a replacement e⁄ect
on inside ￿rms.
[Table 6 about here]
5.2 Alternative measure of FDI: FDI in￿ ow
In addition to multinationals￿a¢ liate sales and exports, the e⁄ect of economic integration should
also be re￿ ected in the ￿ ows of FDI. This section considers FDI ￿ ow as an alternative depen-
dent variable and examines whether regional economic integration leads to additional entries and
investments by outside multinationals.18
Results are obtained for the same set of countries as in Table 6. As seen in Table 7, regional
economic integration does lead to a greater amount of FDI in￿ ow to the integrated countries. This
17The UNCTAD FDI database has also been considered. It has a similar coverage as the OECD dataset.
18This also helps the paper establish that the results obtained in the previous sections are not solely driven by the
e⁄ect of reduced trade barriers on exports of existing ￿rms but also ￿rms￿increasing concentration and investments
in the region.
14e⁄ect also rises with the number of PTA partners the host country has (see the third column) and
the size of the PTA partners (see the fourth column). The PTA between home and host countries,
however, does not have a signi￿cant e⁄ect on the level of FDI ￿ ow. These ￿ndings are similarly
shown in the last column where the market size of PTA partners is separated from that of the rest
of the world. The results there indicate that while a host country￿ s aggregate market potential
is positively associated with its receipt of FDI ￿ ow, the importance of export markets is greater
when they have a preferential trade relationship with the host country.
[Table 7 about here]
5.3 Poisson Quasi-MLE
The paper has so far used either linear or nonlinear Least-Square estimations. As a robustness
analysis, this section considers Poisson quasi-MLE as an alternative estimator. The study by
Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006) points out that Poisson quasi-MLE can be more attractive than
Least-Square estimators when the variance of the error term is a function of the covariates, in which
case the conditional expectation of the logged error term in the log-form estimation equation will
not be zero. Head and Ries (2008) have adopted this approach and found that estimates produced
in this method are smaller than the Least-Square estimates and remarkably robust to the treatment
of zeros and missing values in the FDI data.19
This section follows Head and Ries (2008) and uses the ￿xed-e⁄ect Poisson QMLE. Results are
obtained for both U.S. multinationals￿a¢ liate sales and exports to third countries and reported
in Table 8.20 Similar to the ￿ndings of Head and Ries (2008), most parameters in Table 8, such
as the coe¢ cient of host-country capital-labor ratio, have decreased in magnitude compared to the
estimates in Tables 3 and 5. The parameters of the number of PTA partners and integrated market
potential are, however, adjusted upward in some cases. Countries integrated with a larger number
of partners or partners with a larger market size experience a greater increase in the activities of
outside multinationals.
[Table 8 about here]
5.4 Omitted variables
As described in Section 2, this paper includes country-industry and year ￿xed e⁄ects in all estima-
tions to respectively control for sectoral host-country variables and time factors that may have a
signi￿cant e⁄ect on multinationals￿activities. However, the issue of omitted variables can still arise
in the existing econometric framework. For example, it is possible that the estimated e⁄ect of
PTA has captured the e⁄ect of some other factors such as border and language. It is also possible
19More details on the robustness and e¢ ciency properties of Poisson QMLE are provided in Wooldridge (2002).
20The Poisson QMLE has also been used to estimate FDI from the countries considered in Sections 5.1 and 5.2.
The results are largely similar to Table 7.
15that the current measure of market potential has excluded some important market characteristics,
such as the degree of competition, which can signi￿cantly a⁄ect the demand in host countries and
their ability to attract multinationals. To account for these issues, this section adopts an approach
considered in Head and Mayer (2004) and constructs a generalized measure of market potential
(and export market potential) for each host country.
The procedure proceeds in two steps. First, a standard trade equation is estimated where
the dependent variable is the natural log of imports of country j from country i denoted by Qijt.
More speci￿cally, the equation is characterized as
Qijt = EXit + IMjt + ￿Zijt + "ijt; (6)
where ￿Zijt ￿ ￿1 ln￿ij + ￿2Bij + ￿3Bij ￿ Lij + ￿4PTAijt. In the above equation, EXit denotes
the exporter-year ￿xed e⁄ect, IMjt represents the importer-year ￿xed e⁄ect, and Zijt is a vector
of bilateral market access variables. In particular, Zijt includes ln￿ij, the natural log of distance
between the capitals of the importer and exporter countries, Bij, a dummy variable that is equal to
1 if the trading countries share a border and 0 otherwise, and Lij, a dummy variable that is equal
to 1 when the two countries share a common language. Furthermore, following Head and Mayer
(2004), the equation allows the border e⁄ect to di⁄er across importing countries dependent on
whether it speaks the same language as the exporting country. This hypothesis has been largely
supported by the empirical literature; see, for example, Chen (2004).
To estimate equation (6), a dataset that covers the trade ￿ ows between 80 countries is used.
The results are reported in Table 9. As shown, the estimated e⁄ect of bilateral market ac-
cess, including distance, border, language and PTA, is broadly consistent with the vast literature
that estimates trade ￿ ows using gravity equation.21 These estimates, along with the estimated
importer-year ￿xed e⁄ect d IMjt, are used in the second stage to construct a generalized measure
of market potential.
[Table 9 about here]
Speci￿cally, in the second stage exp(d IMjt) (which takes into account factors such as the degree
of market competition) is adopted as a proxy for the importing country￿ s market demand in a par-
ticular year, and exp[b ￿1 ln￿ij +Bij(b ￿2 +b ￿3Lij)] (which takes into account the relative importance
of distance, border and language in trade) is used as a proxy for the trade cost for country i to
export to country j. The product of these two factors, exp[d IMjt + b ￿1 ln￿ij + Bij(b ￿2 + b ￿3Lij)],
represents the trade-cost weighted import demand in market j faced by exporters in country i,
i.e., b Yjt=b ￿ij. Then, using the estimates of b Yjt=b ￿ij the aggregate market potential for each host
21For a comprehensive review in this area, see, for example, Anderson and van Wincoop (2003).
16country i de￿ned in equation (2) is rewritten as















where each potential importing country￿ s demand is further weighted by its PTA status with host














As in Section 4, the goal is to estimate !1, !2 and !3 ￿ the importance of PTA partners relative
to the rest of the world in determining a country￿ s ability to attract multinationals.
As shown in Table 10, host countries￿aggregate market potential c Mit is positively correlated
with U.S. multinationals￿a¢ liate sales. The market demand in the PTA partners, in particular,
provides a powerful stimulus to multinationals, whereas the market size of unintegrated countries
appears to reduce multinationals￿activities in the host country. This result is not surprising
because when the host countries do not have preferential market access to a foreign market,
the multinational ￿rm may ￿nd it more pro￿table to serve that foreign market through local
production than exports from its existing a¢ liates. This decision will in turn dilute the sales of
the multinational ￿rm in the existing host countries. Host countries￿export market potential c Me
it
is also found to be positively correlated with multinationals￿export-platform FDI. The market
demand of PTA partners, in particular, contributes signi￿cantly to a country￿ s receipt of export-
platform FDI.
[Table 10 about here]
5.5 Endogeneity of economic integration
The concern of endogeneity of PTA may also arise in the context of this paper. There are two
potential sources of endogeneity. First, a host country￿ s PTA status or market potential in its PTA
partners can be correlated with unobserved factors in the residual term. The approach adopted
in the above section, to a certain extent, accounted for this issue. However, the causality between
a country￿ s PTA status and its receipt of FDI may still be questionable. It can be argued that
countries￿adoption of preferential trade agreements is an e⁄ort to attract outside multinationals.
This section thus employs the Instrumental Variable (IV) method to correct for the potential
endogeneity of PTA and establish the causal e⁄ect of PTA on multinationals￿a¢ liate sales.
While a large theoretical literature has been established to address the economic determinants
of PTAs (see, for example, the seminal work by Krugman, 1991a, 1991b; Frankel, 1997; Frankel
et. al, 1995, 1996 and 1998), the empirical literature on this topic is only recently built by Magee
(2003) and Baier and Bergstrand (2004, 2007). This paper follows the theoretical and econometric
17framework of Baier and Bergstrand (2004) and estimates the determinants of two countries￿sharing
of a preferential trade agreement, PTAijt. As in Baier and Bergstrand (2004), the paper considers
that two countries will form a PTA only if the PTA leads to a positive net welfare gain for both
countries and that the level of welfare gain is a function of trade creation and trade diversion.
In particular, three categories of economic determinants are included. First, countries with a
similarly large market size are expected to experience a greater trade creation from the formation
of a PTA and thus have a higher probability of reaching an agreement. Countries with a large
di⁄erence in factor endowment (and consequently in comparative advantage) are also predicted
to derive a greater trade creation after forming a PTA. Their di⁄erences in factor endowment
from the rest of the world are however expected to increase the possibility of trade diversion and
decrease the probability of a PTA. Finally, the welfare gain from forming a PTA is predicted to
be greater between natural trading partners, i.e., countries that are geographically close to each
other but remote from the rest of the world.
In addition to the above economic determinants, a political variable is included in the estimation
of PTA. A large political science literature (see, for example, Gowa and Mans￿eld, 1993) argues
that preferential trade agreements generate a ￿security￿externality and nations often choose to
internalize this externality by forming a PTA with an ally. This argument suggests that countries
with a closer political alliance are more likely to form preferential trade agreements. To measure
the degree of political alliance between two countries, this paper adopts the ￿a¢ nity￿index de-
scribed in Gartzke, Jo and Tucker (1999). This index represents countries￿similarity in votes at
the United Nations￿General Assembly.22
The exact estimation equation is as follows:




























￿ ￿ + ￿5 ln￿ij + ￿6remoteij + ￿7allianceijt + "ijt
3
5:
In this equation, ￿(:) denotes the cumulative probability function, 1=2(lnYit + lnYjt) represents
two countries￿average in natural-log GDP, jlnYit ￿ lnYjtj is their absolute di⁄erence, jln(Kit=Lit)￿
ln(Kjt=Ljt)j re￿ ects two countries￿di⁄erence in factor endowment ratio,23 and 1=2
P
k=i;j jln(Kkt=Lkt)
￿ln(KROW;t=LROW;t)j is their di⁄erence from the rest of the world. Furthermore, the estimation
equation includes ln￿ij, the distance between two countries￿capital cities, and remoteij, their
22The level of political alliance may also a⁄ect two countries￿probability of sharing a PTA through in￿ uencing
the negotiation costs.
23The square of this variable is also included in the estimation to examine if the correlation between countries￿
factor endowment di⁄erence and probability of having a PTA is monotonic.
18remoteness from the rest of world, with













where continentij is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if countries i and j are located in the
same continent and 0 otherwise. The political alliance variable is denoted by allianceijt and is
an index that varies between -1 and 1. A higher value of the a¢ nity index represents a greater
similarity in two countries￿votes at the United Nations General Assembly.
An additional note needs to be made about the estimation of equation (9). Because the
dependent variable, PTAijt, is countries￿status in sharing a PTA at a certain time, it is possible
that this variable has a causal e⁄ect on some of the explanatory variables, such as GDP, and lead
to potential endogeneity. To avoid this possibility, the explanatory variables are lagged by 10 years
such that the data are taken from far enough in the past for most countries.24 An alternative
approach is to estimate countries￿decision to form a PTA, i.e., ￿PTAijt ￿ PTAijt ￿ PTAijt￿1,
instead of their status of sharing an agreement.25 Based on a panel of 65 countries, Probit
estimates are obtained for both speci￿cations.26
[Table 11 about here]
As shown in Table 11, countries with a greater GDP average are indeed more likely to have
a preferential trade agreement. The probability also increases with two countries￿ similarity
in GDP. Countries with a greater di⁄erence in relative factor endowment are found to have a
higher likelihood of sharing a PTA, as expected from the literature. But this e⁄ect diminishes
when the factor endowment di⁄erence exceeds a certain threshold value. The natural trading
partner hypothesis is also supported by the data: countries that are geographically proximate to
each other and remote from the rest of the world are more likely to reach a PTA. The degree
of political alliance is also found to be positively associated with the probability of economic
integration. Countries are signi￿cantly more likely to form a PTA with their political allies. One
surprising result, however, is the ￿nding that countries￿probability of sharing a PTA rises with
their di⁄erences in relative factor endowment from the rest the world even though the theoretical
literature has predicted a greater trade-diversion e⁄ect in this case. The ￿ndings also remain
robust when a country-pair ￿xed e⁄ect is included (see the third and ￿fth columns) and when
countries￿decision to form a PTA is considered as the alternative dependent variable (see columns
under the heading of (2)).27
24However, for countries that formed a PTA before 1986, i.e., the initial EU members, the endogeneity of the
explanatory variables may still exist. Hence, as discussed next an alternative approach that estimates the decision
to form a PTA instead of the status of sharing a PTA is adopted.
25For country pairs that formed a PTA at year T, the value of ￿PTAijt is considered missing for all t > T.
26The sample countries are mainly determined by the availability of the capital formation data.
27A Linear Probability model is adopted when the ￿xed e⁄ect is included in the estimation. The reason to do so
is to avoid the incidental parameter problem that arises in Probit models in the presence of ￿xed e⁄ect.
19In the second stage of the endogeneity analysis, the ￿tted probability of sharing a PTA, i.e.,
c Pr(PTAijt = 1), is obtained based on estimates reported in the third column of Table (11) and
used to calculate countries￿￿tted market potentials. In particular, the host countries￿aggregate
market potential is now28
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The e⁄ect of the ￿tted market potential on MNCs￿a¢ liate sales and exports is then estimated
using the nonlinear Least Squares method as in Section 4. The results are summarized in Table
12. As shown in the second column of Table 12, the ￿tted aggregate market potential continues
to exert a signi￿cant and positive e⁄ect on the level of a¢ liate sales. In particular, a 1% increase
in the ￿tted aggregate market potential leads to a 0.92% increase in multinationals￿a¢ liate sales.
This e⁄ect further rises with the country￿ s probability of sharing a PTA with other countries, as
suggested by the positive parameter of Pr(PTAijt = 1) and the negative parameter of Pr(PTAijt =
0). This ￿nding also holds for the level of exports by multinationals. A country that is more
likely to form a PTA with other markets receives a greater export-platform FDI.
[Table 12 about here]
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the e⁄ect of regional economic integration on countries￿ability to attract
multinationals from outside the bloc. The results indicate that improved market accessibility
within an integrated region leads to an increase in outside multinationals￿activities. The ef-
fect is, however, highly asymmetric across integrated countries. Countries that are integrated
with larger markets experience a greater increase in FDI. Within an integrated region, countries
with a larger labor endowment attract more multinationals especially in labor-intensive industries,
whereas capital-abundant countries experience a decline in FDI. Regional economic integration
also leads to a rise of export-platform FDI. Countries with preferential access to large export
markets are particularly more likely to become the platforms from which multinationals export
to third countries. The paper has also examined the e⁄ect of PTA on intra-bloc FDI and found
that while economic integration raises outside multinationals￿incentive to invest in the region, the
28The ￿tted value of market potential was also calculated based on the predicted probability of signing a PTA,
i.e., P(￿PTAijt = 1), and found to exert a qualitatively similar e⁄ect on the a¢ liate sales.
20e⁄ect does not apply to multinationals within the region. The paper has also undertaken a num-
ber of sensitivity analyses, including adopting Poisson Quasi-MLE as an alternative estimator and
addressing the issues of omitted variables and endogeneity of PTAs. The results remain largely
similar.
The evidence presented in this paper conveys an important message to host-country policy
makers. Not every country bene￿ts from economic integration in their receipt of foreign direct
investment. Some gain at the expense of others. Countries with a relatively large labor en-
dowment or a favorable tax policy, for example, are likely to divert outside multinationals away
from their labor-scarce and high-tax PTA partners. This e⁄ect can generate substantial economic
consequences for both types of countries. Countries that do experience an increase in FDI may
bene￿t from MNCs￿technology spillover to the domestic industries, but often have to deal with the
crowding-out e⁄ect of increased competition. Countries that witness a decrease in multinationals￿
activities face the impacts of losing FDI, which include a potential increase in total unemploy-
ment. As preferential trade agreements become an increasingly popular approach to liberalize
trade, understanding ￿rms￿location preferences in the context of regional integration is crucial for
countries￿selection of optimal preferential trading partners.
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Figure 2: The correlation between country-speci￿c marginal e⁄ect of PTA partners and relative
factor endowment￿ the food industry: the slope is -0.71 with a p-value of 0.01 (only statistically




























































Figure 3: The correlation between country-speci￿c marginal e⁄ect of PTA partners and relative
factor endowment￿ the chemicals industry: the slope is 2.37 for the European countries with a



























































































































Figure 4: The correlation between country-speci￿c marginal e⁄ect of PTA partners and relative
factor endowment￿ the electrical appliances industry: the slope is 1.05 with a p-value of 0.09 (only



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































30Table 3: The impact of regional economic integration on multinational a¢ liate sales
Dependent variable: a¢ liate sales OLS OLS OLS Nonlinear LS
KL endowment ratio -0.65*** -0.63** -0.83*** -0.80***
(0.30) (0.30) (0.30) (0.28)
KL endowment ratio￿capital intensity 3.68* 2.74 3.92* 6.60***
(2.25) (2.23) (2.22) (2.28)
capital intensity -33.88 -23.31 -36.47 -65.82***
(25.11) (24.95) (24.73) (25.46)
corporate tax 0.07 0.06 0.05 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
freight -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.12** -0.14***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
host country￿ s tari⁄ on the U.S. 0.08* 0.08* 0.08* 0.11**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
U.S. tari⁄ on the host country -0.09 -0.08 -0.10* -0.14***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
domestic market size 0.57** 0.64***
(0.28) (0.27)
PTA with the U.S. 0.03 0.12
(0.26) (0.26)
PTA with third countries 0.08*
(0.05)
number of integrated third countries 0.02*
(0.01)
integrated market potential 1.04***
(0.29)
aggregate market potential 6.48***
(1.30)
weight of PTA with home (!1) -0.02
(0.04)
weight of other PTA partners (!2) 0.63**
(0.33)
weight of ROW (!3) 0.51*
(0.28)
Country-industry ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
number of observations 1450 1450 1450 1450
R square 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
Root MSE 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.49







aggregate market potential ￿













(ii) all variables are measured in natural log except capital intensity and PTA dummy;
(iii) standard errors are reported in the parentheses;
(iv) ***, **, and * represent signi￿cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. 31Table 4: The asymmetric impact of regional economic integration
Dependent variable: a¢ liate sales (1)
PTA￿
KL endowment ratio -0.78***
(0.28)








host country￿ s tari⁄ on the U.S. -0.15
(0.12)
U.S. tari⁄ on the host country 0.05
(0.06)
number of observations 1450
R square 0.97
Root MSE 0.49
Dependent variable: a¢ liate sales (2)
PTA￿
￿KL endowment ratio 0.01
(0.09)








￿host country￿ s tari⁄ on the U.S. -0.05
(0.06)
￿U.S. tari⁄ on the host country -0.07
(0.09)
number of observations 1450
Root MSE 0.49
R square 0.97
Notes: (i) all variables are measured in natural log except capital
intensity and PTA; (ii) the rest of the estimates are not reported but
available upon request; (iii) standard errors are reported in the
parentheses; (iv) ***, **, and * represent signi￿cance at 1%, 5%, and
10% level respectively.
32Table 5: The impact of regional economic integration on export-platform FDI
Dependent variable: exports to third countries OLS OLS OLS Nonlinear LS
KL endowment ratio -0.49* -0.71* -0.46* -0.79*
(0.29) (0.39) (0.26) (0.51)
KL endowment ratio￿capital intensity 2.20 1.99 2.32 3.69
(3.89) (3.88) (3.89) (3.89)
capital intensity -15.38 -14.61 -18.79 -34.09
(44.18) (44.03) (44.13) (44.08)
corporate tax -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 0.00
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
freight -0.13* -0.14* -0.14* -0.12
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.10)
host country￿ s tari⁄ on the U.S. 0.22*** 0.24*** 0.22*** 0.24***
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
PTA with third countries 0.39***
(0.11)
number of integrated third countries 0.36***
(0.09)
integrated export market potential 0.02***
(0.00)
aggregate export market potential 0.57*
(0.35)
weight of other PTA partners (!2) 0.92**
(0.50)
weight of ROW (!3) 0.02
(0.02)
Country-industry ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
number of observations 830 830 830 830
R square 0.96 0.96 0.96 0.96
Root MSE 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49





















(ii) all variables are measured in natural log except capital intensity and PTA dummy;
(iii) standard errors are reported in the parentheses;
(iv) ***, **, and * represent signi￿cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
33Table 6: Sensitivity analysis I: including non-U.S. multinationals
Dependent variable: a¢ liate sales OLS OLS OLS Nonlinear LS
KL endowment ratio di⁄erence -0.50 -0.49 -0.50 -0.48***
(0.33) (0.33) (0.34) (0.16)
corporate tax -0.41 -0.40 -0.39 -0.38
(0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.35)
distance -1.14*** -1.12*** -1.12*** -1.18***
(0.12) (0.13) (0.09) (0.08)
ave. of host- and home-country GDP 1.48 1.59 1.69 1.82
(1.29) (1.30) (1.25) (1.51)
di⁄. of host- and home-country GDP -0.34*** -0.34*** -0.33*** -0.31***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
PTA between host and home country -0.05 -0.06
(0.28) (0.29)
PTA between host and third countries 0.59**
(0.31)
host￿ s number of PTA partners 0.004
(0.00)
host￿ s integrated market potential 0.03***
(0.01)
host￿ s aggregate market potential 1.72***
(0.62)
weight of PTA with home (!1) -0.05**
(0.02)
weight of other PTA partners (!2) 0.31***
(0.06)
weight of ROW (!3) 0.22**
(0.12)
Host-country ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home-country ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
number of observations 949 949 949 949
R square 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.89
Root MSE 1.18 1.18 1.18 1.17











aggregate market potential ￿













(ii) all variables are measured in natural log except capital intensity and PTA dummy;
(iii) standard errors are reported in the parentheses;
(iv) ***, **, and * represent signi￿cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
34Table 7: Sensitivity analysis II: the impact of regional economic integration on FDI ￿ ow
Dependent variable: FDI in￿ ow OLS OLS OLS Nonlinear LS
KL endowment ratio di⁄erence -0.22*** -0.11 -0.10 -0.11
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08)
corporate tax 0.05 -0.02 0.03 -0.03
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
distance -1.77*** -1.79*** -1.74*** -1.84***
(0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06)
ave. of host- and home-country GDP 2.29*** 2.84*** 2.68*** 2.61***
(0.66) (0.70) (0.68) (0.73)
di⁄. of host- and home-country GDP -0.35*** -0.33*** -0.32*** -0.33***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
PTA between host and home country -0.09 -0.23
(0.14) (0.15)
PTA between host and third countries 0.43***
(0.17)
host￿ s number of PTA partners 0.02***
(0.01)
host￿ s integrated market potential 0.03***
(0.01)
host￿ s aggregate market potential 3.72**
(2.07)
weight of PTA with home (!1) 1.90
(1.37)
weight of other PTA partners (!2) 5.01***
(0.88)
weight of ROW (!3) 3.92***
(0.56)
Host-country ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Home-country ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
number of observations 12,660 12,660 12,660 12,660
R square 0.45 0.44 0.44 0.45
Root MSE 4.03 4.03 4.03 4.03











aggregate market potential ￿













(ii) all variables are measured in natural log except capital intensity and PTA dummy;
(iii) standard errors are reported in the parentheses;
(iv) ***, **, and * represent signi￿cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
35Table 8: Sensitivity analysis III: estimation results based on the Poisson Quasi-MLE
Dependent variable: Poisson QMLE
(1) a¢ liates sales; (2) exports to third countries (1) (2)
KL endowment ratio 0.11 -0.08** -0.14 0.57
(0.44) (0.04) (1.21) (1.14)
KL endowment ratio￿capital intensity 0.59 0.37 -0.26 -1.60
(2.82) (2.99) (7.31) (4.63)
capital intensity 0.44 3.38 12.24 25.82
(32.55) (34.30) (82.90) (48.67)
corporate tax -0.00 -0.01 0.12 0.09
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
freight -0.11*** -0.11*** -0.17** -0.23***
(0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.07)
host country￿ s tari⁄ on the U.S. 0.04* 0.05* 0.19** 0.16***
(0.02) (0.03) (0.08) (0.06)
U.S. tari⁄ on the host country 0.00 -0.01
(0.04) (0.04)
domestic market size 1.88***
(0.29)
PTA between host and home country 0.25
(0.25)
host￿ s number of PTA partners 0.02** 0.07**
(0.01) (0.03)
integrated market potential 2.00***
(0.32)
integrated export market potential 0.01**
(0.00)
Country-industry ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes Yes Yes
number of observations 1450 1450 1450 1450
Wald chi2 880.1 992.7 490.2 503.4
Prob>chi2 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00




















(ii) dependent variable is measured in absolute level, and explanatory
variables are measured in natural log except capital intensity;
(iii) standard errors are reported in the parentheses;
(iv) ***, **, and * represent signi￿cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
36Table 9: Sensitivity analysis IV: addressing omitted variables (the ￿rst-stage trade equation)









exporter-year ￿xed e⁄ect Yes
importer-year ￿xed e⁄ect Yes
number of observations 56044
R square 0.60
Root MSE 1.86
Notes: (i) standards errors are reported in the
parentheses; (ii) ***, **, and * represent
signi￿cant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
37Table 10: Sensitivity analysis IV: addressing omitted variables (the second-stage estimation with
a generalized measure of market potential)
Dependent variable: Nonlinear LS
(1) a¢ liate sales; (2) exports to third countries (1) (2)
KL endowment ratio -1.00*** -0.63*
(0.31) (0.35)
KL endowment ratio￿capital intensity 4.64** 1.15
(2.24) (3.99)
capital intensity -44.49** -5.80
(25.03) (45.33)




host country￿ s tari⁄ on the U.S. 0.09* 0.21***
(0.05) (0.07)
U.S. tari⁄ on the host country -0.14**
(0.07)
aggregate market potential 0.89***
(0.27)
aggregate export market potential 0.16*
(0.10)
weight of PTA with home (!1) 0.15
(0.67)
weight of other PTA partners (!2) 0.34** 0.16*
(0.18) (0.09)
weight of ROW (!3) -1.06*** 0.10
(0.29) (0.17)
Country-industry ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes
Year ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes
number of observations 1450 830
R square 0.97 0.96
Root MSE 0.49 0.49
Notes: (i) agg. market potential ￿

























(ii) all variables are measured in natural logs except capital intensity;
(iii) standard errors are reported in the parentheses;


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39Table 12: Sensitivity analysis V: addressing potential endogeneity of PTA (the second-stage esti-
mation)
Dependent variable: Nonlinear LS
(1) a¢ liate sales; (2) exports to third countries (1) (2)
KL endowment ratio -0.35 -0.69*
(0.29) (0.40)
KL endowment ratio￿capital intensity 1.23 2.66
(2.25) (3.87)
capital intensity -4.06 -21.86
(25.10) (43.92)




host country￿ s tari⁄ on the U.S. 0.11** 0.24***
(0.05) (0.07)
U.S. tari⁄ on the host country -0.07
(0.06)
instrumented market potential 0.92***
(0.26)
instrumented export market potential 0.19***
(0.06)
weight of Pr(PTAih = 1) (!1) 6.45
(7.79)
weight of Pr(PTAij = 1jj 6= i;h) (!2) 122.58** 400.16**
(61.64) (220.10)
weight of Pr(PTAij = 0jj 6= i;h) (!3) -3.70*** 1.86
(0.57) (2.08)
Country-industry ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes
Year ￿xed e⁄ect Yes Yes
number of observations 1450 830
R square 0.97 0.96
Root MSE 0.44 0.48
Notes:






!2c Pr(PTAijt = 1) ￿
Yjt










!2c Pr(PTAijt = 1) ￿
Yjt





(ii) all variables are measured in natural log except capital intensity;
(iii) standard errors are reported in the parentheses;
(iv) ***, **, and * represent signi￿cance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
40Table A.1: The list of countries in the sample
Argentina Finland Malaysia Spain
Australia France Mexico Sweden
Austria Germany Netherlands Switzerland
Belgium Greece New Zealand Taiwan
Brazil Hong Kong Norway Thailand
Canada Indonesia Peru Turkey
Chile Ireland Philippines United Kingdom
Colombia Israel Portugal Venezuela
Costa Rica Italy Singapore
Denmark Japan South Africa
Ecuador Luxembourg South Korea
Table A.2: The list of included Preferential Trade Agreements
EC EC-Romania
EFTA EFTA-Romania
EC-Switzerland and Liechtenstein EFTA-Bulgaria
EC-Iceland EC-Bulgaria
EC-Norway NAFTA
EC-Algeria Costa Rica-Mexico
EC-Syria Canada-Israel
CER Turkey-Israel
United States-Israel Canada-Chile
EC-Andorra Turkey-Romania
MERCOSUR EC-Tunisia
EFTA-Turkey Mexico-Nicaragua
EFTA-Israel Turkey-Bulgaria
41